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ABSTRACT 
This article critically engages aspects of Kate Bornstein's transgender theory as found in Gender Outlaw. Drawing on recent work in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, and on insights from Bornstein's account, I pose questions about the ways in which sex, gender, desire, and 
subjectivity are theorized. 
RESUME 
Cet article discute de facon critique les aspects de la theorie de transgenderisme de Kate Borsntein tels que retrouves dans "Gender 
Outlaw." En me servant d'ouvrages recents sur la psychoanalyse lacanienne, et sur les compte-rendus de Bornstein, je questionne la 
facon dont on met en theorie le sexe, le genre, le desir et la subjectivite. 
As a feminist teaching and researching in 
the field of the sociology of gender, I found myself 
drawn, as others were in the early 1990s, to 
accounts of transsexuality for the insight they might 
provide into the complexities of gender. In 1992 I 
wrote a critique of the fantasy of the naturally 
gendered body, a fantasy that is prevalent not only 
in contemporary North American society, but also 
in contemporary theories of gender, including some 
transsexual accounts. The idea that one's anatomical 
sex determines one's gender so that the two must 
correspond or be made to correspond struck me as 
disproven long ago, not only by Freud, and by 
feminists, but by transsexuals themselves. Partial to 
psychoanalytic theory, I am attentive to the limits 
that our human being presents us with, particularly 
with what Charles Shepherdson has called "the 
inevitability of sexually marked embodiment" 
(161), a point I elaborate below. 
The 1994 publication of Gender Outlaw, 
a text that now appears on numerous sexuality and 
gender courses across North America, provides 
another occasion to explore the relationship 
between transsexuality, gender, and the body. 
Important questions for me are: what, if anything, 
makes one a woman (or a man)? and, how crucial 
is it to the functioning of desire that we occupy an 
embodied position? I shall not be concerned with 
the question of what kinds of bodies ought to 
occupy the symbolic positions "woman" and "man," 
because this leads to a kind of policing that I find 
unhelpful. A more fruitful task for feminists, in my 
view, is to lend support to transgendered people 
(some of whom, like Bornstein, are feminists 
themselves) who also struggle with an oppressive 
gender order. To clarify, Bornstein uses 
"transgendered" in the broad sense of the term to 
include all those who break one or more of the 
"rules of gender" (46-50). I also prefer the broader 
category, but for me it would include anyone who 
identifies with it. The narrower definition of 
transgendered refers to people living in a gender 
other than that originally assigned, but who do not 
desire sex reassignment surgery (SRS) (Bornstein, 
68). 
The transgender theory developed by 
Bornstein is that of a post-operative, male-to-
female transsexual. Bornstein's book includes, 
among other things, a detailed and complex account 
of her own experience of gender, a series of 
theoretical reflections on conceptions of gender and 
sexuality in contemporary North American society, 
and a defence of sexual and gender multiplicity. My 
purpose here is not to describe what is a lively and 
provocative treatment of gendered and 
transgendered experience (such a task clearly would 
require a separate article), but to offer some critical 
reflections on specific assumptions Bornstein 
makes, and on some of the implications of her 
theory. 
Although Bornstein argues that 
dissatisfaction with the status quo is sufficient to 
account for the radical transsexual demand for 
surgical transformation, I maintain that something 
more than this dissatisfaction is suggested by her 
own account. My interpretation is no doubt 
contentious, and involves weaving into an 
enormously contradictory text a thread or two of 
my own. It is simply one way of making sense of 
Bornstein's text, a text that is intricate, difficult, 
surprising, and that offers considerable insight into 
the impossible nature of human desire. I begin with 
a critique of the theory Bornstein offers, focusing 
on what I found most problematic in it. Then, after 
clarifying (in as simple language as is possible) the 
psychoanalytic theory I rely on for my reading, I 
explain why I think Bornstein's surgery improved 
her life by failing to make her a woman. It is 
important to add here that although the desire to 
change sex may take a similar form in various 
persons, the experience of physical transformation 
may produce radically different effects. For 
instance, Jan Morris interprets her SRS as affirming 
her essence as female, whereas Bornstein interprets 
it as simply allowing her to pass more easily as a 
woman, not that it makes her female. 
While I take it to be a good sign that 
people are coming to question, in increasing 
numbers, dogmatic and conventional ideas about 
what it means to "have" a sex, or to "belong" to a 
gender, I find Bornstein's transgender theory 
somewhat less radical and somewhat less 
challenging than it claims to be. Understandably, 
readers unhappy with mainstream theories of sex 
and gender (theories that are clearly alive and well, 
at least in my community) may find themselves 
drawn to a theory that presents itself as the 
alternative to the dominant ideology. One of my 
concerns, though, is that in order to present her 
theory as the alternative, Bornstein sets up a series 
of false oppositions between the Gender Outlaws, 
on the one hand, and the Gender Conformists, on 
the other. Bornstein's rhetorical distaste for 
dichotomies notwithstanding, she certainly creates 
her own as follows: 1. between the transgendered 
and the "traditionally gendered;" 2. between those 
who believe themselves to be outside sex, and those 
who believe their sex defines who they are and; 3. 
between the theorization of sex, gender, desire, and 
subjectivity developed by transsexuals and that 
which is proposed by the dominant ideology. 
Providing a brief sketch of two friends of mine may 
help to illustrate the inadequacy of these 
dichotomies, and to remind us that in the field of 
gender, one does not simply have the Law-abiding 
on the one hand, and the Outlaws on the other, as 
Bornstein would have us believe. 
Friend A is a corporate executive, drives a 
very expensive car, very fast, has a strong, 
muscular body, is handy with a hammer, and 
prefers women. Friend B is a bookstore employee, 
has a high, hysterical laugh, hates physical labour, 
has a fragile, often sickly body, and is an occasional 
heterosexual. Contrary to the gender norms of my 
society, A is a woman and B is a man. Neither A 
nor B considers him/herself transgendered, neither 
seeks the creation of a new category or a "third sex" 
to describe identity, and neither conforms to social 
expectations. Moreover, neither believes that 
anatomical, hormonal or chromosomal make-up 
determines behaviour or sexual orientation. Both 
accept their bodies along with the various 
limitations those bodies present them with. Both 
have a playful, irreverent relationship to gender 
which allows them to scramble socially established 
codes for femininity and masculinity, and to 
challenge in their personal lives dominant views of 
what it means to live as a woman or as a man. 
I include this sketch of A and B not to 
claim some unwarranted generalization about their 
behaviour, nor to suggest Bomstein does not 
encourage multiple expressions of gender, but to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of Bornstein's 
dichotomy. There appear to be people who are 
neither "transgendered" nor "traditionally 
gendered." Moreover, I believe understanding their 
lives requires a more complex theorization of the 
subject and of sex, gender, and desire than 
Bornstein has provided. While she claims that 
"most...people continually struggle to maintain the 
illusion that they are one gender or the other" (65), 
I find, on the contrary, that most people are not 
preoccupied with proving their membership in the 
categories woman or man. Indeed, most people 
appear to take such membership for granted as 
Bornstein herself implies when she claims: "I 
bought into the two-gender system like most 
everyone else" (244). Perhaps what most of us 
struggle to achieve is rather a particular image of 
femininity or masculinity, an image which may win 
us social approval and that in any case we imagine 
will win us something. Even so, this effort is by no 
means universal, and other gender theorists such as 
Carol Travis, claim that "most men and 
women...are flexible about masculinity and 
femininity not only across situations, but over the 
course of their lives (294)." As Bornstein is well 
aware, feminists have a long history of contesting 
the gender order, a history that clearly disrupts the 
oppositional categories of conformist and outlaw 
she creates. 
The fact that feminists and critical theorists 
of gender have produced critiques of gender similar 
to Bornstein's for some time may limit the novelty 
but not the value of Bornstein's contribution. What 
is new here is her inclusion of "nonoperative" (as 
well as pre- and post-operative transsexuals) in the 
group of people seeking to "establish a 
space...outside of the socially sanctioned gender 
system" (Bornstein 1995, 241). (Nonoperative 
transsexuals are those who choose to live as the 
other sex without SRS.) Bornstein's desire to 
establish such a space suggests that increasing 
emphasis is being placed on contesting social 
norms and practices and perhaps a little less is 
being placed on transforming bodies. Thus, the 
increase in, or even the appearance of, nonoperative 
transsexuals may indicate that the widespread 
normative assumption that one's "sex" determines 
one's gender is at long last being undermined. 
At the same time, however, if one holds 
the view that one's gender identity always floats 
free of one's "natural" or "original" sex (conceived 
either as physical body or as body-image), then 
how does one argue for sex reassignment surgery? 
Why go to all the pain and expense of changing 
anatomical sex once the previously conceived 
connection between sex and gender has been 
severed? As both Bernice Hausman and Thomas 
Laqueur demonstrate, the concepts of sex and 
gender, plus the way their relationship is 
understood, have a history. Hausman makes a 
convincing argument that "gender identity" has now 
become the dominant term and is used by the 
medical profession to justify the sex reassignment 
demanded by many transsexuals. That is, if one's 
gender identity as a woman or man is assumed to be 
definitive of one's essence, then it becomes 
reasonable to expect or to demand that one's body 
be made to conform with it. But given her emphasis 
on the gender outlaw, and given her refusal of any 
connection between anatomical sex and gender, 
Bornstein risks eroding not only the medical 
justification for granting SRS, but also the 
transsexual rationale for changing sex. In other 
words, if one does not have to possess or inhabit a 
female body in order to have a feminine identity, 
then why bother with SRS? 
What I am suggesting here is that 
Bornstein learned this the hard way. That is, in her 
case, SRS enabled her to take up a symbolic 
position as a woman, a position from which to 
grasp that sexual embodiment is symbolic, that one 
cannot become a woman or a man by altering one's 
genitals, that the attempt to do so will fail because 
one's genitals do not create the positions 
man/woman in the first place, nor do they guarantee 
one will fit comfortably into the roles socially 
prescribed for those who take them up. In order to 
explain my reading, 1 need to take a brief detour 
through the psychoanalytic theory upon which it is 
based. 
In "The Role of Gender and the Imperative 
of Sex" Charles Shepherdson develops a Lacanian 
psychoanalytic concept of subjectivity that 
distinguishes between the social construction of 
gender on the one hand, and the human imperative 
to represent oneself as embodied on the other. 
According to Shepherdson, taking on a sexed 
identity is a symbolic moment (that is, one's identity 
must be represented). One emerges as a subject by 
repressing a phallic identity (where I imagine I am 
what the (m)Other desires) and by signifying the 
loss of that phallic identity (where I imagine 1 am a 
woman, or a man). Phallic identity positions me as 
the disembodied plaything of parental desire, 
whereas sexed embodiment positions me as a 
singular, embodied subject. In a society other than 
ours, the possibility of representing one's 
embodiment differently might exist, as long as it 
signifies some kind of lack as opposed to an 
imagined unity with the (m)Other. (Even the 
astonishing intersexual, who has both penis and 
vagina, cited by Anne Fausto-Sterling, plays with 
giving and receiving the phallus on the grounds that 
she is not the phallus for or of another [23].) For 
Shepherdson, the symbolic position one takes up is 
neither given in nature, nor dictated by one's 
anatomy, nor is it ever completely stable, founded 
as it is on the repression of the fantasy of union 
with the Other, and the splitting of the subject. (The 
repression of the fantasy of union is not, as some 
feminists claim, a simple rejection of the Other as 
mother. A daughter's or son's identification with the 
mother is not the same thing as an unconscious 
fantasy of union with her.) The main point here is 
that failure to take up a position as sexually marked 
means one is unable to separate one's own desire 
from that of an Other, unable to be a desiring 
subject in one's own right. 
Shepherdson also suggests that the 
psychoanalytic understanding of the constitution of 
the sexed subject already includes an ambiguity and 
uncertainty that counters the predominant cultural 
fantasy of fixity and stability. Joan Copjec, whose 
work Shepherdson cites, puts it this way: "the 
subject position inscribed by a discourse is not the 
same as the position of the subject who is engaged 
by that discourse, no more than the T of the 
statement is the same as the T who speaks it"(12). 
Copjec is concerned to show how psychoanalysis 
differs from Foucauldian understandings of the 
subject, where the subject is conceived as multiple 
instead of divided, arguing that "the problem 
with...believing that the subject can be conceived as 
all of those multiple, often conflicting, positions 
that social practices construct, is that the ex-centric, 
or equivocal, relation of the subject to these 
discourses is never made visible and the nature of 
her conflict in the social is seriously misconceived" 
(13). If one is never identical to the position one 
takes up, then the fixity and certainty that Bornstein 
rightly accuses the mainstream of producing (an 
idea she once bought into, and claims other people 
buy into) is clearly a fantasy. 
One more piece is needed here to make 
sense of this theory. In a patriarchal society the 
phallus is assumed to be the signifier of desire, but 
a child must not be the phallus for the (m)Other. 
Giving up that desire entails representing oneself as 
lacking vis-a-vis the phallus. The symbolic 
positions man/woman allow one to represent 
oneself as having or lacking the phallus: both are 
positions of loss because neither is able to be the 
phallus (the object of desire). 
To return to the text in question, I have 
come to suspect that what Bornstein got with her 
SRS was not just a new body, but also, and more 
importantly, an embodied position as a woman 
from which to enact or perform her own desire. 
This gave her access to the knowledge that she 
always had been free to represent herself 
(symbolically) as a woman regardless of her 
anatomical makeup. Thus, like Dorothy in the 
Wizard of Oz, who learns in the end, and after going 
through her own personal nightmare, that it is she 
and not the wizard who has the power to take her 
home, Bornstein learns that she has the power to 
live as a woman without asking the physician's 
permission or submitting to the knife. In this sense, 
I believe Bornstein's surgery was effective insofar 
as it failed to achieve what initially was expected: 
to make her a woman: "I live my life as a 
woman...but I'm not under any illusion that I am a 
woman....It's the difference between being an 
identity and having an identity. The latter makes 
more room for individual growth, I think" 
(Bornstein 1995, 243). Unlike some transsexuals 
(Morris, for instance), Bornstein learns to overcome 
her previous illusion that gender concerns a state of 
being that can be bestowed, and comes to see it 
instead as an identification one makes. From a 
Lacanian perspective, discovering this gap between 
being and having, between the physical body and 
the representation of embodiment, is a crucial part 
of establishing human subjectivity. 
Now I am in a position to suggest that one 
of the reasons Bornstein's text is difficult to follow 
is because she confuses what Shepherdson calls the 
imperative of sexual embodiment with the social 
conventions we attach to gender identity, and 
believes herself to be free of both. I contend, 
however, that Bornstein only becomes free to play 
with gender identity after she takes on a symbolic 
embodiment (as a woman). Perhaps what she has 
freed herself from is a previous, enslaving 
compulsion to become the desire of the Other, to be 
what she imagined some Other wanted her to be? 
(Incidently, 1 view compulsions as common to all 
of us, although we do not usually become aware of 
them unless they are either very strong or contrary 
to important social rules or norms. Jean Laplanche 
and J.B. Pontalis define compulsion as "a form of 
behaviour to which the subject is obliged by an 
internal constraint. Thoughts (obsessions), actions, 
defensive operations or even complex patterns of 
behaviour may be termed compulsive where their 
not being accomplished is felt as inevitably giving 
rise to anxiety" [77].) 
Illustrating the point about compulsion and 
about the need for embodiment, Bornstein writes: 
"it was my unshakeable conviction that I was not a 
boy or a man. It was the absence of a feeling, rather 
than its presence, that convinced me to change my 
gender" (24). A good example of what it might feel 
like to be outside sex, Bornstein writes here in the 
past tense, producing a retrospective explanation 
for decisions taken earlier in her life. The 
compulsion itself is never analyzed, only described 
or even justified through references to the external 
constraints of the gender order. The concept of 
compulsion suggests, however, that no change, 
however radical, to the gender order (or to the 
fictitious idea of its natural base) will suffice to 
alter the transsexual desire to change sex. This is 
because we are dealing with a subject in conflict 
with itself and, to cite Copjec, "the subject's 
essential conflict with itself cannot be reduced by 
any social arrangement" (17). 
I am not suggesting that there are no 
external forces or constraints with which we come 
into conflict: here it should be clear that I share 
much of Bornstein's critique of an inflexible, 
heterosexist and patriarchal gender order. What I 
am suggesting is that Bornstein's location of all 
conflict on the outside - on the gender order and on 
the persons who support it - could be a way to 
avoid acknowledging any potential inner conflict. 
Bornstein's goal is to question or alter the world, 
not to question or alter her own desire. Analyzing 
desire involves taking something apart in order to 
see how the different pieces go together, or whether 
they go together; it involves discerning which 
pieces are left out or left over, and figuring out 
where the pieces come from. Certainly Bornstein 
strives to analyze the gender order, but when it 
comes to her own life, her aim is not to analyze, but 
to integrate: "I keep trying to integrate my life. I 
keep trying to make all the pieces into one piece. 
As a result, my identity becomes my body which 
becomes my fashion which becomes my writing 
style. Then I perform what I've written in an effort 
to integrate my life, and that becomes my identity, 
after a fashion" (1). 
One's "real gender identity" according to 
Bornstein is whatever one makes it, whatever one 
chooses to perform (38): "Sex is fucking, gender is 
everything else" (116). On this view, conflict arises 
solely from the social requirement to conform to 
the gender order, whereas freedom means freedom 
from the need to participate in the gender system 
(83). While I agree with Bornstein that an excessive 
need to conform to the gender order enslaves one to 
a particular kind of compulsion, I would suggest 
that an excessive need to "transcend" not only the 
conventions of the gender order, but sexual 
difference itself, is equally enslaving. Shepherdson 
describes the latter compulsion as a need to comply 
with a "punishing identification," a need to satisfy 
a wholly narcissistic and annihilating demand of 
some internalized Other (174). If this 
psychoanalytic interpretation is true, then granting 
the transsexual demand for SRS is not a question of 
granting the transsexuals' desire to "engineer 
themselves," as Hausman describes it (9), it is a 
question of complying with the Other's demand that 
one not have a desire of one's own. In making her 
main point that the transsexual dependence on 
medical discourses and technology is consistently 
downplayed and deserves much more attention, 
Hausman underestimates the compulsive behaviour 
which, from my perspective, makes the transsexual 
more driven than in control. Here I am assuming 
that, although most of us are driven by our various 
compulsions, it is preferable to know about them 
and thus to be able to make decisions concerning 
our response to them, than to simply act on them. 
Lacanian psychoanalysis interprets the 
compulsion to change sex as signifying a failure to 
achieve, or at least to sustain, a sexed identification. 
The failure to signify oneself as sexed points to 
some internal conflict, a conflict between a subject 
in search of embodiment and the punative demand 
of some internalized Other that one not become a 
desiring subject. This theory provides one way to 
explain Bornstein's claim that even if she had 
known prior to her surgery that gender was a 
construct not dependent on genitalia, she would still 
have had SRS. 
Those who claim, as sociologist Frank 
Lewins does, that the social acceptance of males 
living as women and vice versa would "render 
reassignment surgery unnecessary" (159) are 
missing an important piece of the puzzle that is 
transsexuality. (It appears that Lewin's goal as 
parent of a transsexual is to justify, not to question, 
the logic of his daughter's desire. Accordingly, he 
construes his own perspective, in typically 
masculinist fashion, as that of "intellectual 
understanding" which he contrasts with the 
explicitly "political" goals of some feminists [159].) 
The pieces do not fit neatly together, though, even 
if one imagines one has them all (and one never 
does!). Even though Bornstein acquires the ability 
to "play" with gender after her SRS .enables her, not 
to "be" a woman, but to take up a sexed identity as 
a woman, she nevertheless appears to turn that play 
into a new kind of crisis with a search for the 
ultimate "unshakable" identity: 
First I question an identity that I have, 
then I see all its bad qualities, and 
eventually I lose it or give it up. Then I get 
what seems to be a new, more pure, more 
unshakable identity, and I go through 
learning the ropes about what it means to 
be that new identity. Then, once I'm 
comfortable in the new identity, I question 
that, and the identity crisis starts all over 
again. It's what I did with gender; it's what 
I'm still doing with gender. (117-118) 
From a Lacanian perspective, Bornstein's 
celebration of "gender fluidity" and shedding 
identities by metaphorically, and not so 
metaphorically, crawling out of one's skin, may be 
read as a sign of a subject in search of embodiment, 
one who is still driven by the desire of an Other, 
and who mistakes that desire for her own. 
Accordingly, Shepherdson warns that "to celebrate 
the transsexual as a 'free' subject, the most avant-
garde instance of the 'malleability of gender,' is to 
disregard the virtually transfixed character of this 
identification, and the suffering it entails" (175). 
While there is certainly suffering in 
Bornstein's text, there is also celebration. This 
celebration is not the euphoria of someone 
convinced she is a woman, but a celebration of the 
recognition that acquiring sexed identification 
enables one to be a desiring subject, that is, free to 
experience one's own desire rather than enacting 
someone else's. Perhaps what we have in this text is 
both the story of how Bornstein conceived her 
identity historically (hence the photographs 
suggesting an autobiographical text) and the re-
reading of that history after her identity has been 
differently located. Clearly, Bornstein's desire to be 
a woman and her knowledge that one cannot 
become a woman but only live as a woman sit 
uncomfortably together in this text. Furthermore, 
Bornstein also learns that living "as a woman" is 
impossible to specify, hence the utility of the idea 
of gender as performance. 
It is clear that I support Shepherdson's 
view that the process of becoming a subject 
necessitates confronting the question of sexed 
embodiment (where the subject is lacking). 
Imagining subjects to be either beyond sexed 
embodiment, or wholly determined by that 
embodiment, disables them from existing in their 
own right, a disability that is perhaps definitive of, 
though not exclusive to, transsexuality. And if, in 
the end, the identity Bornstein gets is never a stable 
one (148), perhaps that is because it is the nature of 
sexed identity to be unstable, to be open to 
question. At least according to Elizabeth Grosz, 
knowing there is "an instability at the very heart of 
sex and bodies" (214) is more valuable than 
knowing that sex and gender do not have to 
correspond. Maybe for Bornstein, as well as for the 
rest of us, a more significant transformation of the 
relationship to one's sex and to one's body requires 
neither denying nor transcending, but embracing 
that instability. 
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